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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : Brief of Appellant 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
BRIAN K. BUSICK, : Case No. 930212-CA 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(g) (1993 Repl. Vol.) provides this 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from an order on a petition 
for extraordinary writ sought by an incarcerated appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the District Court err in refusing to consider the issue 
of Mr. Busick's alleged illegal detention before the arrival of the 
Governor's Warrant and in determining that the documents supporting 
the Governor's Warrant were properly executed as well as that 
Mr. Busick was timely served with the Governor's Warrant once it 
arrived. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from a denial of a petition for habeas corpus 
relief, this Court must consider the record in the light most 
favorable to the findings and judgment of the trial court. Webb v. 
Van Per Veur, 853 P.2d 898 (Utah App. 1993), quoting Bundv v. 
Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Addendum A to this brief contains the full text of the 
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 (1993 Rep. Vol.) 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12 (1993 Repl. Vol.) 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV (1993 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-30-3 (1993 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-30-10 (1993 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-30-23(3) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 8, 1993, Judge Medley held an evidentiary hearing on 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Mr. Busick. The state presented 
the testimony of Sergeant Matthew Pavich, a police officer in the 
state of Arizona. Officer Pavich testified that he had a 
conversation with Mr. Busick in Arizona concerning a homicide the 
officer was investigating. T. 16. Sergeant Pavich did not remember 
the date of the conversation and did not document the date. T. 18. 
The officer testified that at the time of the conversation he took 
a polaroid snapshot of the person he was interviewing. T. 18. The 
Officer testified that he also did not record any date or any name 
on the photo. T. 18. The Polaroid snapshot was introduced into 
evidence. The officer further testified that he believed the man 
he interviewed to be the man in the court on this date. 
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"The state presented testimony of Deputy Ron Cowdell of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. Deputy ^owde:l testified ~ u v 
he T*'r>cei veri Ccv^ r" , - •_ ' ' ^' s v?iia J^ 
-cemoer *..t The documents received ly "Deputy 
Cowdell were placed into evidence. The Depute ^^ther test:"'"! 
that "c ~erv= " • ..*„eracei -. - J2, 
i.:.. *eek attei rece. f ' cross-examination; Deputy 
Cowdell indicated Mr. Busick was ordered released - .v---
aft~ ?. • - -.. -O^JA continued 
to *• :ie-c t:y ,.ne jail- w.ti: <u: a court appearance until October 2~, 
1992, when he was brough*" bef^r^ -* ^ aaistrat^ ;v : --"•* - ^s 
.irges ;••-/ Cowdell testified 
wiiat ^: information indicated the fugitive charges were filed 
November 22, "^; 
i a. i .. i. -.-^ence, counsel for Mr. Busick 
proffered testimony tnav M: . busick was not i n the jurisdiction of 
Arizona from r~:'i AuauF*~ * —^-rlr' ^  "~" : — ^e 
c .—: uiu.id, counsel proffered 
that *'r 3usick was, at the time of this hearing, missir -rrrt 
tooth while the persrr ppea j 
a , - _*w~u i trie evidence Mr. Busick, through 
counseI, argued: 
1. That Mr. Bus:-1 : 
A. . . •_ .^ ..*<_ oi^xcjea offense ana is not the 
person charged with the crime tor which he is sought. 
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2. That the documents contained in the Governor's 
warrant were not executed properly because the 
exemplification contained in the documents is not signed 
by the Judge of the Superior Court of Coconino County, 
Arizona, and yet the clerk of the Court signed, 
indicating the validity of the Judge's signature which 
was not present. A copy of the exemplification is 
attached hereto as "Addendum A." 
3. That the Governor's warrant was not served with 
required speed. The documents were received by the 
Sheriff's office December 21, 1992, but not served until 
December 29, 1992. See Utah Code Ann. §77-30-10. 
4. That Mr. Busick was unlawfully detained from 
October 22, 1992, to October 27, 1992. Mr. Busick was 
released on Utah charges on October 22, 1992, pursuant to 
an acquittal, however, he continued to be held in jail 
until October 27, 1992, when he was brought before a 
magistrate and informed of fugitive charges. 
Upon conclusion of argument, the court made the following 
findings: 
1. That the person in custody is the same person sought 
in the extradition request. 
2. That, based on testimony and documents provided, 
Mr. Busick is charged with an offense and, further, is a 
fugitive. 
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3. The documents contained in the Governor's warrant are 
valid. The documents preceding the exemplification are 
properly executed, therefore, the unsigned 
exemplification in question is duplicative and harmless. 
4. This Court will not consider the alleged illegal 
detention because such issues should have been brought 
before the court earlier and is not appropriate to 
consider in the Writ of Habeas Corpus petition. 
The Court denied the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
entered a dismissal in an order signed April 20, 1993. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The documents contained in the Governor's warrant were not 
executed properly. The exemplification from Arizona attests that 
the copy of the Indictment included is true and correct. The 
exemplification calls for the signature of the court clerk and then 
a judge's signature which authenticates the signature and indicates 
that person is the clerk of the court. The exemplification sent 
from Arizona is not signed by the judge. The lack of this 
signature combined with confusion about the date of the alleged 
offense which exists in the affidavit of John Verkamp casts doubt 
on the veracity of the documents. 
Further, Mr. Busick was detained illegally form October 22, 
1992, to October 27, 1992 without being brought before a magistrate 
for a determination of probable cause to continue to detain him. 
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Once the Governor's warrant did arrive, Mr. Busick was not 
served with the papers forthwith as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§77-30-10 (as amended). 
Lastly, the state did not produce sufficient evidence to rebut 
Mr. Busick's proffered evidence that he was not in Arizona at the 
time he is alleged to have been present and that he is not the 
person sought by Arizona on the alleged offense. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The documents contained in the Governor's 
Warrant were not executed properly. 
The State of Arizona included an "EXEMPLIFICATION" with the 
documents supporting it's request for a governor's warrant. See 
Addendum B (The Exemplification was introduced at the hearing on 
the Writ held April 8, 1993 as State's Exhibit 2). In that 
exemplification, Shirley Stevenson purports to be the clerk of the 
Superior Court of the County of Coconino. Further, she claims to 
have compared the copy of the Bench Warrant and Indictment included 
with the original contained in her records. 
Following this statement is a certification in which Judge 
Charles D. Adams of the Superior Court of Coconino County, State of 
Arizona certifies that Shirley Stevenson is in fact clerk of the 
Superior Court and that the signature following her statement is 
genuine. However, that prepared statement of Judge Adams does not 
contain a signature. 
Shirley Stevenson then attests to the authenticity of 
Judge Adams' signature contained in the above statement when, in 
6 
fact, no signature exists. The fact that Ms. Stevenson vouched to 
the authenticity of a signature which apparently did not exist at 
the time she signed casts doubt on whether or not Ms. Stevenson 
acted appropriately in reviewing the documents. Further, it casts 
doubt on the validity of these signatures. 
Mr. Busick contends that, as a result of this defect, the 
extradition documents on their face raise questions of their 
validity. The importance of the exemplification is that it 
authenticates the copy of the Indictment included with the request 
for extradition which is required by Utah Code Ann. Section 77-30-3 
(1993 Repl. Vol.) and 77-30-23(3) (1993 Repl. Vol.). Mr. Busick 
contends that the exemplification is part of the certification of 
the Indictment which is required by statute. 
The state argued at the hearing that the exemplification 
lacking the appropriate signatures was duplicitous and not 
required. However, the exemplification which does bear a Judge's 
signature (a different Judge than the one named in the second 
exemplification) attests only that Shirley Stevenson is the Court 
clerk. The second exemplification may not be important but the 
exemplification which was not signed is particularly important to 
the authenticity of the Indictment which holds Mr. Busick. 
Moreover, the entire process the Arizona Court used in 
completing these documents is suspect because it appears 
Ms. Stevenson has attested to the validity of a signature which 
does not exist. The correct procedure would be for Ms. Stevenson 
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to be present when the Judge signed and only then can she attest to 
the validity of the signature. 
Further, the documents contain a copy of an Indictment which 
alleges the offense in question took place on or about September 
29, 1991. However, the affidavit of John Verkamp, included with 
the documents supporting the request for extradition, indicates 
that Mr. Busick was charged with the criminal offense on 
November 1, 1992. If the date alleged in John Verkamp's affidavit 
is accurate; Mr. Busick was held with no formal charges filed in 
October of 1992. At the hearing, Sergeant Pavich testified he 
believed that the affidavit contained a typographical error, 
however, the affiant was not brought to testify and all this Court 
has to consider is the documents on their face. 
2. Mr. Busick was detained illegally from 
October 22, 1992 to October 27, 1992. 
On October 22, 1992, Mr. Busick was acquitted of Utah charges 
for which he had been incarcerated. Mr. Busick was ordered 
released from jail immediately pursuant to the acquittal. However, 
Mr. Busick continued to be detained in jail without being brought 
before a magistrate to explain the reason for his detention until 
October 27, 1992. On that date, Mr. Busick was brought to video 
arraignments in the jail and informed he was being held on charges 
of being a fugitive out of the state of Arizona. 
In his Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mr. Busick argued that this 
delay in being brought before a magistrate to be informed of the 
reason for his continued detention was unjustified and, therefore, 
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violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution as well as Art. I, 
§7 of the Utah Constitution. 
In the case of County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 
U.S. , 114 L.Ed 2d 49, 111 S. Ct (1991), the United States 
Supreme Court considered the question of how quickly a defendant 
incarcerated without a warrant must be taken before a magistrate 
for a determination of probable cause. The Court balanced the 
competing interests between the state's interest in "protecting 
public safety by taking into custody those persons who are 
reasonably suspected of having engaged in criminal activity" versus 
seeking to avoid "prolonged detention based on incorrect or 
unfounded suspicion [which] may unjustly 'imperil [a] suspect's 
job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family 
relationships.'" Id. at 60. 
The Court concluded that a determination of probable cause 
must be made "'either before or promptly after arrest.'" (emphasis 
in original). Id. The Court went on to explain this requirement 
did not necessarily mean immediately. Id. The Court emphasized 
flexibility taking into account the state's pretrial procedure. 
Id. at 61. However, "flexibility has its limits". Id. at 62. 
There is no "blank check". Id. With these concerns in mind, the 
Court considered what period of delay would be acceptable as an 
outer guide. The Court concluded that a probable cause 
determination made within 48 hours of arrest will, "as a general 
matter, comply with the promptness requirement . . .". Id. at 63. 
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After that point the burden then shifts to the state to show "a 
bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance". Id. 
Moreover, intervening weekends do not qualify as an extraordinary 
circumstance. Id. (emphasis added). The defendant must be taken 
before a magistrate as soon as practically possible, "but in no 
event later than 48 hours after arrest." Id. 
Mr. Busick argues that the five days he was held before being 
brought before a magistrate for a determination of whether probable 
cause existed to continue to detain him violated the rule set out 
in McLaughlin and, as a result of the delay Mr. Busick's liberty 
was unreasonably restrained. Further, this initial illegal 
detention is what allowed Arizona to prepare and submit a 
Governor's Warrant. Illegal detention of Mr. Busick allowed Utah 
and Arizona time which they were not entitled to in order to 
prepare a case against him. This type of detention is prohibited 
by McLaughlin. 
3. Mr. Busick was not served with the 
Governor's Warrant "forthwith" as required by 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-30-10. 
Detective Cowdell testified that the Governor's Warrant was 
mailed from the Governor's office locally on December 21, 1992. 
T.5. He testified he received the Warrant approximately a day 
after that. T.5. However, Detective Cowdell did not serve the 
Governor's Warrant until December 27, 19 92. T.8. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-30-10 states in pertinent part; 
No person arrested upon such warrant shall be 
delivered over to the agent whom the executive 
authority demanding him shall have appointed 
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to receive him unless he shall first be taken 
forthwith before a judge of a court of record 
in this state who shall inform him of the 
demand made for his surrender and of the crime 
with which he is charged and that he has a 
right to procure and demand legal counsel ... 
(emphasis added) 
Mr. Busick contends that he was not taken forthwith before a 
Judge as the statute requires. Mr. Busick7s position is that 
"forthwith" as used in the statute imposes a similar responsibility 
to that requirement that a defendant held without a warrant be 
taken before a magistrate for determination of probable cause. 
In Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. , 114 L.Ed2d 49, 111 
S.Ct (1991), discussed previously, the Supreme Court balanced 
what it characterized as the competing concerns of flexibility and 
practicality taking into consideration the burden on the system, 
Id. at 61, and the fact that flexibility cannot be a "blank check". 
Id. Further stating that a state has "no legitimate interest in 
detaining for extended periods individuals who have been arrested 
without probable cause." Id. In balancing the competing concerns 
the Court determined that while there is not a rigid-set period of 
time in which a person must be taken before a magistrate, 48 hours 
will be presumed reasonable promptness. Id. at 63. After that 
time, the burden shifts to the government to "demonstrate the 
existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary 
circumstances." Id. 
Mr. Busick argues that the requirement upon arrival of a 
Governor's Warrant should be considered similar because the judge 
in the asylum jurisdiction is required to consider whether this 
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person is in fact being held on existing charges. Further, the 
Judge must consider whether a magistrate in the demanding 
jurisdiction has made a determination that probable cause exists to 
believe a crime has been committed. While the asylum Court is not 
making a typical probable cause determination, it is assuring that 
a magistrate has found probable cause as reflected in the documents 
supporting the warrant. 
Appellant's position is that policy reasons exist for 
interpreting "forthwith" in Utah Code Ann. 77-30-10 (as amended) 
consistently with other time requirements of determinations of 
probable cause. Typically a prisoner has already been held for 3 0 
to 60 days waiting for preparation and arrival of the Governor's 
Warrant and there is no reason for further delay in service of the 
Warrant once it has arrived. Utah authorities simply have to serve 
the warrant. They are not required to complete any additional 
paperwork before service. 
4. Mr. Busick denies that he is the person 
sought by Arizona on the offense alleged. 
Under Emig v. Hayward, 703 P. 2d 1043 (Utah 1985) the presence 
of a Governor's warrant is prima facie evidence that Mr. Busick is 
the person sought by Arizona, however, he is entitled to present 
evidence that he is not the person sought by the demanding 
jurisdiction. 
Evidence was proffered by the defense at the hearing on the 
Writ that Mr. Busick was not in the jurisdiction of Arizona from 
mid-August until approximately mid-November. T. 24. Further, the 
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court observed that the person in the photograph has all of his 
teeth while Mr. Busick is missing one front tooth. T. 24. 
Therefore, Mr. Busick did set forth evidence that he is not the 
person interviewed in Arizona for the alleged offense. 
The state provided no fingerprints from Arizona to compare 
with Utah prints to determine if the person is one in the same. 
The officer testified it was an oversight on his part. T. 16. 
Further, the officer testified from recollection as to the date of 
the interview and the date he took the photo because he did not 
document any of that information. T. 18. 
Mr. Busick contends that the officer's testimony and 
recollection alone is not sufficient to show he is the man Arizona 
charged in light of evidence presented by him that he is not the 
gentleman charged. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Busick asks this Court to reverse the trial court's order 
dismissing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -y9^day of October, 1993. 
SUSAN M. DENHARDT 
Attorney for Defendant 
'PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, SUSAN M. DENHARDT, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the office of the County Attorney, 
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this Q 7 ? A day of 
October, 1993. 
SUSAN M. DENHARDT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MAILED/DELIVERED this day of October, 1993. 
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AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Anns, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT HI 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
AJLR. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2. 
A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *=» 82; 
Weapons «» 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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Art. I, § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid 
because it delegates to industnal commission 
the power to hear, consider and determine con-
troversies between litigants as to ultimate lia-
bility, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122 
(1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of 
third party, a stranger to employment, are not 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248. 
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next 
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266. 
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 47. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 129. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitu-
tional Law §§ 613 to 617. 
C.J.S. — 16D CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§§ 1428 to 1437. 
AJLR. — Exclusion of public from state 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6. 
limited to recovery under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act exclusively, unless they have as-
signed their rights to insurance earner. Robin-
son v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 
(1927). 
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential-
ity of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 
A.L.R.4th 1196. 
False light invasion of privacy—defenses 
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244. 
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or other-
wise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as 
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57 
A.L.R.4th 404. 
Libel or slander: defamation by statement 
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520. 
Defamation: designation as scab, 65 
A.L.R.4th 1000. 
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfer-
ing with prospective civil action, as actionable, 
70 A.L.R.4th 984. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law 
«=> 322, 324, 327, 328. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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77-30-3 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
What documents presented 77-30-3- Form of demand 
must show. 
No demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another 
state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing alleging, except in 
cases arising under Section 77-30-6, that the accused was present in the de-
manding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and that 
thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment 
found or by information supported by affidavit m the state having jurisdiction 
of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, 
together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon or by a copy 
of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence composed in execution, together 
with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the 
person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his 
bail, probation or parole. The indictment, information or affidavit made before 
the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having 
committed a crime under the law of that state and the copy of the indictment, 
information, affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenti-
cated by the executive authority making the demand. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit based on hearsay 
Affidavit requirement. 
Authentication 
Sufficiency of demand 
Affidavit based on hearsay. 
Extradition warrant can be issued on the ba-
sis of an affidavit based on hearsay. Langley v 
Hayward, 656 P 2d 1020 (Utah 1982). 
Affidavit requirement 
An affidavit is not required with the extradi-
tion papers when the charge is contained in an 
indictment found by the grand jury Ludahl v. 
Larson, 586 P 2d 439 (Utah 1978). 
Authentication. 
In extradition proceedings under former 
statute, authentication of papers attached or 
annexed to requisition was sufficient, although 
governor did not certify to genuineness of an-
nexed papers, where provisions of federal stat-
utes were substantially complied with Bell v 
Corless, 57 Utah 604, 196 P 568 (1921) 
Authentication required was that of the gov-
ernor of the demanding state; requirement was 
satisfied by first sentence of request for extra-
dition signed by the demanding state's gover-
nor declaring that the annexed papers had 
been authenticated in accordance with laws of 
that state Birmingham v Larson, 26 Utah 2d 
414, 490 P2d 893 (1971) 
Sufficiency of demand. 
In habeas corpus proceedings by fugitive 
from another state, affidavits for requisition 
that contained positive and direct statements 
of fact and charged in direct terms the commis-
sion of crime were sufficient Harris v. 
Burbidge, 58 Utah 392, 199 P 663 (1921). 
Where one was accused of being fugitive 
from justice from state demanding his extradi-
tion, it was held in habeas corpus proceeding 
that court did not err in denying petitioner 
right to introduce evidence tending to show 
that he was not fugitive from justice and that 
affidavits in support of requisition were false, 
since surrendering state had no legal right to 
take evidence or attempt to inquire into facts 
constituting :nme by going behind positive 
statements of requisition affidavits nor to 
question sufficiency of such papers in any way 
when it appeared upon their face that they met 
requirements of statute Harris v. Burbidge, 58 
Utah 392, 199 P 663 (1921). 
Where a demand of the state of Oregon for 
extradition was written, alleged the presence 
of the plaintiff in the state of Oregon at the 
time of the alleged crime and that he fled from 
the state thereafter, and had attached a num-
ber of documents which the governor certified 
to be authentic and true, the demand for extra-
dition complied with the requirements of for-
mer section Little v Beckstead, 11 Utah 2d 
270, 358 P2d 93 (1961) 
660 
EXTRADITION 77-30-10 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-9, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. Extradition § 12. 
Key Numbers. — Extradition *=» 37. 
77-30-10. Time to apply for habeas corpus allowed. 
No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent 
whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive 
him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record 
in this state who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender and 
of the crime with which he is charged and that he has the right to demand and 
procure legal counsel and if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or 
they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge of such court of record 
shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for a writ 
of habeas corpus. When such writ is applied for, notice thereof and the time 
and place of hearing thereon shall be given to the prosecuting officer of the 
county in which the arrest is made and in which the accused is in custody, and 
to the said agent of the demanding state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-10, enacted by L. Habeas corpus, Utah Const., Art. I, § 5; 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B(f). 
Cross-References. — Courts of record enu- Right to counsel, Utah Const., Art. I, § 12; 
merated, § 78-1-2. §§ 77-1-6, Rule 7 U.R.Cr.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS den was then upon the prisoner to offer con-
vincing proof that he was not the person de-
Burden of proof. manded. Mora v. Larson, 540 P.2d 520 (Utah 
—Identity of fugitive. 1975). 
Challenging validity of process.
 P e r s o n n^^g extradition has the burden 
Illegal means.
 to p r o v e that he is not the person named in the 
Necessity for appeal. rendition warrant, or that the information does 
not state a crime under the law of the demand-
Burden of proof. ing state, or that he was not in the demanding 
Habeas corpus petitioner who denies that he state when the alleged crime was committed, 
is a fugitive from justice has the burden of Phillips v. Vance, 594 P.2d 885 (Utah 1979). 
proving that fact by clear and convincing evi- State has the burden of proving that the per-
dence. Langley v. Hayward, 656 P.2d 1020 son arrested is the person named in the extra-
(Utah 1982). dition papers, and a prima facie case is estab-
Identity of fugitive lished where the state shows that the arrested 
Petitioner was entitled to release in habeas Pf"™ h a s o r i s ^ w n by the same name as 
corpus proceedings prior to execution of extra- * * appearing on the papers; where state has 
dition since the state of Utah did not produce m a d e a P™*3 fac*e <***> ^ e h a b e a s «nnis P*j 
any means of identifying him except his first titioner has the burden of going forward with 
and last name, and it was alleged that there affirmative evidence that he is not the person 
were at least four other persons in Salt Lake named in the papers, and where he does so, the 
area bearing the same first and last names, state is required to corroborate the petitioner's 
Madsen v. Larsen, 527 P.2d 227 (Utah 1974). identity with the person named in the extradi-
In extradition proceedings a prima facie case tion papers, and where the state so corrobo-
was made by the governor's rendition warrant rates, the court must weigh the evidence and 
and by showing that prisoner had the same make a finding on the issue of identity. Lang-
name as that of the wanted man, and the bur- ley v. Hayward, 656 P.2d 1020 (Utah 1982). 
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EXTRADITION 77-30-23 
agent, commanding him to receive the person so charged if delivered to him 
and convey him to the proper officer of the county in this state in which the 
offense was committed. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-22, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. Extradition §§ 4-6, 16. 
Key Numbers. — Extradition *» 23-26, 36. 
77-30-23. Fugitives from this state — Applications for req-
uisition for return. 
(1) When the return to this state of a person charged with a crime in this 
state is required, the prosecuting attorney shall present to the governor his 
written application for a requisition for the return of the person charged, in 
which application shall be stated the name of the person so charged, the crime 
charged against him, the approximate time, place, and circumstances of its 
commission, the state in which he is believed to be, including the location of 
the accused therein at the time the application is made, and certifying that in 
the opinion of the said prosecuting attorney the ends of justice require the 
arrest and return of the accused to this state for trial and that the proceeding 
is not instituted to enforce a private claim. 
(2) When the return to this state is required of a person who has been 
convicted of a crime in this state and has escaped from confinement or broken 
the terms of his bail, probation, or parole, the prosecuting attorney of the 
county in which the offense was committed, the parole board, or the warden of 
the institution or sheriff of the county from which escape was made shall 
present to the governor a written application for a requisition for the return of 
such person, in which application shall be stated the name of the person, the 
crime of which he was convicted, the circumstances of his escape from confine-
ment, or of the breach of the terms of his bail, probation, or parole, the state in 
which he is believed to be, including the location of the person therein at the 
time application is made. 
(3) The application shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in dupli-
cate, and shall be accompanied by two certified copies of the indictment re-
turned, or information and affidavit filed, or of the complaint made to the 
judge or magistrate stating the offense with which the accused is charged, or 
of the judgment or conviction, or of the sentence. 
The prosecuting officer, parole board, warden, or sheriff may also attach 
such further affidavits and other documents in duplicate as he shall deem 
proper to be submitted with such application. One copy of the application with 
the action of the governor indicated by endorsement thereon and one of the 
certified copies of the indictment, complaint, information, and affidavits or of 
the judgment of conviction or of the sentence shall be filed in the office of the 
governor to remain of record in that office. The other copies of all papers shall 
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